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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
:\I Erl'ALS Ml\NUF ACTURING
< i< L\l P ANY, a r:-tah corporation,
PI a,i ntiff' a.·1ul .Appel! an f,

Case

-VR.-

No. 10116

IL\1\ 1\: OF CO~'ll\IERCE,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant a;n.d Respondent.

APPELLANT''S BRIE.F

NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment dismissing appellant's Complaint and holding that appellant was not
entitled to recover for construction, addition to, alteration, or repair to a building, structure, or improvement
upon land under Utah Bond Statute 14-2-1 and 14-2-2.

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
The case was submitted to the Court, sitting without a jury. The trial court ruled that an aluminum rail1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing made to order and fabricated for installation in a
building at the instance and request of the defendant
and affixed to the floor and walls of a building was personal property and was not an addition to, alteration, or
repair of a building and structure within the meaning of
Utah Code Annotated 14-2-1.

RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks to reverse the decision of the court
below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During May of 1963, Arnold Drews, of Modern Ornamental Iron Works, ordered three sections of aluminum
railings and three gates from the appellant, fabricated
to order, in accordance with plans and specifications, for
installation in a building located in Magna, Utah, (R. 21,
22, 23, 41) and leased by respondent for a commercial
banking business. (R. 33)
Appellant fabricated said railings and gates and delivered them to Arnold Drews. (R. 21, 22, 23) Drews in
turn installed and affixed the railings and gates to the
floors and walls in the bank building (R. 31, 32, 35, 41)
leased by the respondent and was subsequently paid by
the respondent bank in full (Dep., 5, 6), but thereafter
refused to pay the appellant the agreed contractual price
for the labor, materials and profit involved in the fabrication of said railings and gates. (Dep. 6)
There was no issue over the fact that the installation of the railings and gates was made on leased prem·
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ises. ( PrP-'Prin I ()rder) l r ndPr the terms of respondent's
LPa~(',

rP~pondPnt

lesseP agreed \\·ith lessor to make
said impro\·ements to the building. (R. 38) (Plaintiff'~
~~xhibit 10) Accordingly, this case involves improvem£lnt ~ made to a leasehold interest and is within the Bond
~tatutP 1-+-~-1. HPP Buehner Block C(nnpan.lJ v. Glezos. 6
lTtah ~d 226,310 P. 2d 317 (1957).
tltP

H(·~pondent

bank did not secure from its contractor,
.Arnold 11rl \VS, a Performance or Payment Bond as required h~· 1-!-2-1. (Pre-Trial Order) (Dep. 6).) After
t hP railings and gates "·ere fabricated to order and in~talled, both Drews and the respondent bank refused to
pay appellant (Dep. 6), and accordingly, appellant
brought this action for payment of the reasonable Yalue
of the rnilings and gates fabricated to order for the rrspondPnt bank.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GR~\NT RELIEF TO THE APPELLANT UNDER UTAH STATUTES 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2.
l~tah

Code Annotated 14-2-1 clearly states:
~'The

O\vner of any interest in land entering into
a contract, involving $500.00 or more, for the construction, addition to, or alteration. or repair of,
any building, structure or inzprorenzent upon lanrl
shall, before any such \vork is commenced, obtain
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the
contract price ... and any person "·ho has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon
any such building, structure or improvement, pay-
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ment for \vhich has not been made, shall have a
direct right of action against the sureties . . . ''
(Emphasis supplied)
Utah Code Annotated 14-2-2:
''Any person subject to the provisions of this
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond . . . shall be personally liable to all
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in any case
the prices agreed upon.''
Respondent did not secure a bond as required and
no\v argues the Statute is inapplicable because it merely
purchased an item of personal property.
The railings and gates were made to order and fabricated specifically to fit into this particular building and
were affixed to both the walls and the floors of the building. Mr. Charles I. Canfield, on page 4 of his deposition,
in answer to a question, stated:
''So I asked him if he would have them come out
and contact me relative to the construction and delivery of these railings. A l\Ir. Drews called on
me and I told him what I wanted. He said he
would take it and take the measurements, figure
what he could do the job for, and would submit a
bid. This he did, and I authorized him to go ahead
and prepare the railings for us.'' (Emphasis
supplied)
This statement of fact by J\Ir. Canfield clearly sho\\TS
that the railings and gates were an audition, alteration,
4
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or repair, to n building, structure, and improvement
upon land. And then at page 9 of the deposition, in ans\\·Pr to a question by 1\Ir. Mecham, Mr. Canfield further
stated:
''.:\In. l\[Ec HAl\I: Did you prepare a scale
dra,ving of this?

''A. ) . es.
''MR. l\IECHAM : Where is the scale

drawing~

"A. I don't where, Mr. Mecham.

We have
another one my boy made the other day, which
would be just the same as this. It was just the
layout, but I did put it to scale so I knew how much
footage I needed for each.
''MR. MECHAM : For each of the areas ?

"A. Yes.

''MR. MECHAM : You drew this, of course, to fit
this particular building?
''A. That is right, to fit the building.

'' ~IR. MEcHAM: That is all.''
The special construction of the railings and gates
sho,vs they were intended to constitute a part of the
building.
''The fact that the article was specially constructed or fitted with a view to its location and use on
the particular land or in the particular building,
it being consequently less readily susceptible of
use elsewhere, tends to show that it was intended
to constitute a part of the land.'' Knoff Woodwork
Company Y. Zotalis, 213 Minn. 204, 6 N.W. 2d 264,
266 (1942).
5
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In addition, the desirability of the railing a~ a part
of the finish of the building for the purpose for "·hich
it is desired, indicates the railings and gates are a part
of the land and, therefore, an improvement. See Neu·
York Life Insurance Company v. Allison, 107 F. 179,
46 C.C.A. 229 (1901), Cert. Denied 21 S. Ct. 923, 181 U.S.
618; Southern California Telephone Company v. State
Board of Education, 12 Cal. 2d 127, 82 P. 2d 422 (1938).
And, on page 11 :
'' 1\iR. MECHAl\1:

to the

How are the partitions fixed

building~

''A. They were just nailed to the floor. All we
have to do is to take one side out and t'vo nails
right out. ' '
The fact that the railings and gates are removable
without material injury to the freehold does not defeat
the nature of the railing and gates as fixtures. C.J.S.,
Sec. 5, page 610.
The Court, in Helms v. Gilroy, 20 Or. 517, 26 P. 851,
853 ( 1891), held machinery was a part of the fixture. In
a suit to foreclose a mortgage, the Court said:
"It is true the scre,vs and bolts 'vith which it 'vas
annexed could have been taken out, and the machinery removed, without serious damage to it or
the building, but so, no doubt, could have been
the doors and windows. It was, in its very nature,
adapted to the business for which the land was
used. The party making the annexation must
have intended that it should remain as long as it
continued serviceable .... ''
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In n~Jation to pPrmaneH<'y, it appears to be suffieient
that thP railing i~ intended to remain 'vhere placed aR
long as the building to ""hich it is annexed may he used
for the snmP banking purpsP. See Trabue Pittn1a11 Corp.,
Lin1.ifcd v. Los .Llngeles Cou11fy, 29 Cal. 2d 385, 175 P.
:!d :> 1~ ( 1946) .

l\Ir. Canfield further recognized the fact that the
railings "·ere in fact fixtures at page 14 of his deposition. In answer to a question, Mr. Canfield stated:
'' Q. Did you contemplate the possibility of
such a move when you planned the furniture and
equipment in the Bank of Commerce~

''A. Not for ten years because our lease runs
ten years. Unless some development came that
\vould make it financially feasible to sub-lease
these quarters and move some place else.

''MR. l\IEcHAl\I: You provided that in your
lease'?
''.A... Yes.
'' l\IR. MECHAM: So that any of these fixtures
could be taken out~

"A. Yes, or moved to any place we want to at
our convenience.''
. .:\.nd, on Page 16, ~Ir. Canfield stated:

"Q. I call your attention to paragraph 10 of the
lease, \vhich is on page 2. Did you have anything
to do "ith the specific negotiation of this paragraph in the lease~
' '.A.. Yes, I did.
•
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'' Q. 'Vill you explain that, please?
''A. The original lease was drawn hy ~Ir. John
Rokich and he sent the form over to me for my
approval and also a copy to Mr. Paulos, I think
~Ir. Ernest Paulos for his approval.
''After I read it he had left out this provision
relative to removing items that we would put in.
Remodeling, changing the interior and so forth i~
outlined in this paragraph 10. That had been left
out.

''I sent the lease back to him and told him
"·hat we wanted, we wanted that provision put in
the lease. I also explained Mr. Paulos "·a~ agreeable to it.
"Mr. Rokich then rewrote the lease "'ith
paragraph 10 in.

thi~

"Q. Why did you want it in'
''A. So we could remove these fixtures an<1
.
t ... "
equ1pmen
Under the ruling of the lower court, any railing or
gate affixed to a structure and made to order which is
an alteration, addition, or repair to an existing structure, but which could be unbolted and remoYed is not
such an addition, alteration, or repair vvithin the meaning
of Utah Code Annotated 14-2-1. Under the ruling of the
lower court, it is apparent also that the plaintiff and appellant did not have a lien right to secure its payment for
the fabrication and construction of the railing added
to and secured to the said Bank building. The Supreme
Court of Utah has on many occasions announced the
fact that "the Statute of Utah no",. under revie\\. i~
8
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anxilinry to our mechanie 's liPn la\\·, and just as much
in aid of it as if it had been made part of it and incorporah-d in the same rhapter.'' Rio Grande Lu1nber Conlpany v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 124-, 167 P. 241 (1917).
''The purpose of the Statute is to prevent owners
of land from having their .lands improved \vith
the materials and labor furnished and performed
by third persons, and thus to enhance the value
of such lands, without becoming personally responsible for the reasonable value of materials
and labor which enhanced its value.'' Liberty Coal
& I.Jumber Company v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 P.
341, 343 (1917).
If the contractor has not reserved enough of a fund
in his own hands to pay for the materials provided him
by the appellant, then the respondent bank, by not requiring a bond under the Statute, incurs the risk of
having to pay over again for these items.
''Because of the common purpose of these lien
and contractors' bond statutes, and their practically identical language, adjudications as to what
is lienable under the former are helpful in determining the proper application of the latter. ' '
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company,
13 Utah 2d 339, 341, 374 P. 2d 254 (1962).
This Court, in the case of King Brothers, Inc. v
l""fah Dry Kiln Cornpany, supra, stated:
''In order to qualify under these statutes it is necessary that there be an annexation to the land, or
to some permanent structure upon it, so that the
materials in question can properly be regarded as
having become a part of the realty; or a fixture
9
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appurtenant to it~ and this mnst haYP been doih\
\vith the intention of making it a permane11t part
thereof. That the addition is consistent "~ith
the use to \vhich the property is pnt is often helpful in making the determination.'' Ibid at :~-1-~.
Other courts have perhaps laid greater stress on the
requirement of adaption or appropriation to the use of
the building, as has been stated by Tiffany:

''A consideration on \\~hich the cases usually lay
great stress, in determining the character of the
article as a fixture Ye I non, is its character, as related to the uses to \vhieh the land has been appropriated, it being regarded as a fixture only in caRr
there is a correspondence bet\veen its character,
and consequently its prospective use, and the use
to \vhich the land is devoted.'' Tiffany, Real Propert~~, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 610, p. 371.
In the instant case, \Ye haYc the fabrication ancl
manufacture of railings and gates to the order of the
respondent lessee; these said railings and gates "rere
affixed to the floor and "~ails of said structure : under
the terms of the Lease Agreement, it \\~as the intention
of the respondent and lessee that these railings and
gates be the permanent part of said structure until such
time as the lease expired and the lessee decided to remove same from the building. The addition of the railings and the gates \vas consistent \\·ith the use to \vhich
the property \vas put. The ~\gTl'Pment and the intention
to remoYe \Yas an agreement between the lessor and the
lessee, and the appellant in this case had no kno\vledge
or understanding, or information \vi th reference to the
10
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agrct-mPnt het\vet-n the I(·~sor and the
t hPsP ~aid ra i1ings and gates.

]p~see

to ren1oYe

In other 'vords, the appellant 'vas n third party
and not a party to the agreement bet\veen the respondent
nnd the landlord. Therefore, since there is no pri,·ity,
the ag-reement is not binding upon the appellant. This
point is \VPll stated by the Supreme Court of California:
"It is well stated, however, that such a contract,
\vhether express or implied, is not effective against
those not bound by the agreement; for example,
innocent third persons. In such cases the intent
that is material is that reasonably manifested by
out\\~ard appearances.'' Trabue Pittman Corp.,
Limited v. Los Angeles County, 29 Cal. 2d 385,
175 P. 2d 512, 529 (1946).
1\lthough there is no arbitrary standard to be applied, the appellant in the case at hand was a. third party
not bound by the agreement. The plaintiff, through representations made to it by the non-paying contractor,
\Yas led to believe the railings and gates were to be
used in a bank in Idaho, and, therefore, had no notice,
actual or constructive, of the lease agreement.
'' . .<\part from statute, it is usually held or stated,
as a general rule, that, although the parties may,
as between themselves, agree that chattels to be
annexed to realty shall remain personalty or be
subject to a right of removal ... such agreements
cannot ordinarily affect the rights of innocent
third persons 'Yithout notice thereof .... " C.J.S.,
Sec. 17, pp. 638-639.
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the neeessity of notice bet"·een the parties to the agreement
11
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and the third party, i.e., the appellant in the case at
hand.
''Where a structure is placed upon the laud of
another with an agreement before attachment that
it is to be, and remain, personal property, and not
to become a part of the realty, and that it may he
removed by the builder, the authorities are in
unison to the effect that such an agreement will
prevail as against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the realty who has notice, actual or constructive, of the agreement." Workman Y. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 406, 266 P. 1033 (1928).
In accord with the leading cases on the subject, the
intention of the annexer to make a permanent addition
to the land is of paramount importance. See Tea.fl v.
Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634 (1853) ; 1Vork1nan v. Henrie, supra.
However, the controlling intent is the apparent intent of the parties outwardly manifested to the appellant, the apparent intent being the annexation of the
railings and gates as an improvement to land.
''Of course, it is true ... that generally the intent
of the parties is a controlling criterion in ascertaining 'vhether property is permanently attached
to the land or retains its identity as personalty.
This applies between the immediate parties to a
transaction, such as mortgagor and mortgagee,
Yendor, and vendee, etc., and their successors in
interst. But 'vhere, as here, the rights of a person
unconnected 'Yith that transaction are concerned,
and 'vho is without actual or constructive notice
concerning the intent of the parties responsible for
annexing the personalty to the land, the question
is not so much the intent of the parties as the ap-

12
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pa rPnt intent ns it 'vould reasonably appear to
surh third perRons." IIammond T~umber Co. Y.
Gordon, 84 Cal. App. 701, 258 P. 612, 614 (1927).
Ev{\n if the railings and gates "~ere considered as
trnde fixtures and, therefore, removable without the
inserted elause in the lease, the argument is relevant
only as to the lessor and lessee. See H ammon.d Lu,mber
Co. v. Gordon., supra.
CONCLUSION
In considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant (King Brothers, Inc., v. Utah Dry
Kiln Co., supra), it is as clear as the sun on a cloudless
day that the railings and gates were fabricated and constructed especially to the order of the respondent and
affixed to the building which the respondent was leasing
for the purpose of operating its said bank. To hold
that the Utah Bond Statute does not apply in this instance would be to hold that any addition to, alteration,
construction, or improvement to land which was affixed
as a matter of fact, but which could be unfixed by the
removal of screws and bolts, or nails, would serve to
defeat the application of the Statute which we urge
should apply in this instance. The factual situation surrounding the case points out emphatically that the nature of the railings and gates was that of an addition
to, alteration, construction, or improvement to land,
i. e., special construction tends to show that the railings
and gates were intended to constitute a part of the land
and building; desirability as a part of the architectural
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design or finish of the building indicates the railings
and gates are a part of the building; the fact that the
railings and gates are removable "~ithout matPrial injur~·
to the freehold does not defeat the nature of the items as
a fixture; the appellant \\Tas a third party and not a
party to the transaction bet,veen the lessor and lesSPP
and, therefore, the agreement is not binding upon thP
appellant.
Because the purpose of the Statute is to protect
those ''Tho performed labor and furnished the mat(·rials
incorporated into the building, counsel for the appellant
urges this Court to reverse the decision of the court
belo'v and a\vard to the appellant the damages as prayed
in its Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAThi & PRATT
By ALLAN E. MECHAM
351 South State Street
Salt Lake Cit~r, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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